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Abstract — Since 1981, when Lamport introduced 
the remote user authentication scheme using table, 
a plenty of schemes had been proposed with table 
and without table using. Recently Das, Saxena and 
Gulati have proposed A dynamic ID-based remote 
user authentication scheme. They claimed that 
their scheme is secure against ID-theft, and can 
resist the reply attacks, forgery attacks, insider 
attacks and so on. 
In this paper we show that Das et al.’s scheme is 
completely insecure and using of this scheme is 
like an open server access without password. 1  
Index Terms — Authentication, cryptography, 
security, cryptanalysis,  smart cards, proxy 
user.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
EMOTE user authentication schemes allow a 
valid user to login to the remote server and to 
access the services provided. This authentication 
process runs over the insecure channels. Lamport’s 
table based authentication scheme was enhanced in 
2000, by Hwang and Li [7], to remote user 
authentication scheme using smart cards. 
Afterwards many schemes have been proposed to 
make secure the authentication over insecure 
channels. 
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. 
Recently Das et al. proposed a dynamic ID-
based authentication scheme. In this scheme they 
introduce the concept of dynamic ID to overcome 
the problem of partial information leakage in static 
ID based schemes. This also avoids the risk of ID-
theft. 
 In this paper, we shall point out that the Das et 
al. scheme is completely insecure. We shall show 
that in ‘Login Phase’ of this scheme the send login 
request is password independent. User may type 
any random password instead of a real one. 
Scheme does not prevent him from login.  
In section II we review the Das et al’s scheme. 
Section III consists of the comments on the 
scheme. Finally in section IV a brief conclusion is 
given.  
II. REVIEW OF THE DAS ET AL. SCHEME 
In this section, we briefly review Das et al. 
scheme [5]. This scheme is composed of the 
registration phase, Login phase, authentication 
phase and the password change phase. The 
notations used are as follows: 
U   the user 
PW   the password of user U 
S    the remote server 
h(.)   a one way hash function 
⊕    bitwise XOR operation 
A  B: M A sends M to B over secure channel 
A → B : M A sends M to B over insecure channel 
 
Different phases work as follows: 
R
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A. Registration Phase 
A user Ui wants to register to the remote 
system S.  
1. Ui  submits PWi to S 
2. S computes Ni = h(PWi) ⊕ h(x), where x is 
secret of the remote system. 
3. S Personalizes the smartcard with the 
parameters [h(.), Ni,  y ], where y is a 
remote server’s secret number stored in 
each registered user’s smartcard. 
4. S  Ui : PWi and smartcard. 
B. Login Phase 
The user wants to login, inserts its smartcard to the 
terminal and keys his password PWi . The 
smartcard perform the following steps: 
1. Computes CIDi = h(PWi) ⊕ h(Ni ⊕ y ⊕ T), 
where T  is the current date and time. 
2. Computes Bi = h(CIDi ⊕ h(PWi)) 
3. Computes Ci  = h(T ⊕ Ni ⊕  Bi ⊕ y)  
4. Ui → S: CID, Ni , Ci , T 
C. Authentication Phase 
Upon receiving the login request  (CID, Ni , Ci , T) 
at time T* , S verifies as : 
1. Verify the validity of the time interval  T – 
T* 
2. Computes  h(PWi) = CIDi  ⊕ h(Ni ⊕ y ⊕ T) 
3. Computes Bi = h(CIDi ⊕ h(PWi)) 
4. Checks that Ci  = h(T ⊕ Ni ⊕  Bi ⊕ y)  holds 
to accept the login request. 
D. Password Change Phase 
When user wants to change the password he 
inserts smartcard in to the device, keys thw 
password PWi and request to change the password 
to new one PWNew. Smartcard computes Ni* = Ni  ⊕  
h(PWi) ⊕  h(PWNew) and replaces the Ni with new 
Ni* . Password gets changed. 
III. COMMENT ON DAS ET AL. SCHEME  
The Login and authentication phase is 
completely insecure, because whole process of 
authentication is independent of the password. 
Attack may work as –  
Login Phase 
The user wants to login, inserts its smartcard  to the 
terminal and keys a random password P instead of 
his real password PWi . The smartcard perform the 
following steps: 
1. Computes CIDi = h(P) ⊕ h(Ni ⊕ y ⊕ T), 
where T  is the current date and time. 
2. Computes Bi = h(CIDi ⊕ h(P)) 
3. Computes Ci  = h(T ⊕ Ni ⊕  Bi ⊕ y)  
4. Ui → S: CID, Ni , Ci , T 
A. Authentication Phase 
Upon receiving the login request (CID, Ni , Ci , T) 
at time T* , S verifies as : 
1. Verify the validity of the time interval  T 
– T* 
2. Computes  h(P) = CIDi  ⊕ h(Ni ⊕ y ⊕ T) 
3. Computes Bi = h(CIDi ⊕ h(P)) 
4. Checks that Ci  = h(T ⊕ Ni ⊕  Bi ⊕ y)  
holds to accept the login request. 
Ci will hold true, this shows that this scheme is 
equivalent to no password scheme, because with 
any random password user may access the server. 
 
Suppose an intruder theft the smartcard for a 
short duration and makes a duplicate of it. Now he 
has no need to crack the password because he may 
insert any random password. Server will 
authenticate the intruder as a valid user as 
discussed above. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
In this paper we show that the Das et al.’s scheme 
is insecure and works like an open channel. No 
password is required to authenticate the user. This 
scheme does not fulfill the basic need of 
authentication schemes. 
. 
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